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Abstract
The public constitutes a major stakeholder in the debate about, and resolution of privacy and ethical
issues in Big Data research about human affairs. Thus, scientists must learn to take public concerns
about  Big  Data  research  seriously  and  how  to  communicate  messages  designed  to  build  trust  in
specific big data projects and the institution of science in general. This chapter explores the
implications  of  various  examples  of  engaging  the  public  in  online  activities  such  as  Wikipedia  that
contrast with “Notice and Consent” forms and offers models for scientists to consider when
approaching  their  potential  subjects  in  research.  Drawing  from  Lessig,  Code  and  Other  Laws  of
Cyberspace, the chapter suggests that four main regulators drive the shape of online activity: Code (or
Architecture),  Laws,  Markets,  and  Norms.  Specifically,  scientists  should  adopt  best  practices  in
protecting computerized Big Data (Code), remain completely transparent about their data management
practices  (Law),  make  smart  choices  when  deploying  digital  solutions  that  place  a  premium  on
information protection (Market), and, critically, portray themselves to the public as seriously
concerned with protecting the privacy of persons and security of data (Norms). The community of Big
Data users and collectors should remember that such data are not just “out there” somewhere but are
the intimate details of the lives of real persons who have just as deep an interest in protecting their
privacy as they do in the good work that is conducted with such data.
Ethical concerns in Big Data are of particular interest to a variety of professionals, researchers, and
specialists. As the volume and variety of such data continue to grow rapidly, individuals from fields as
different as geography and biomedical sciences to software engineering and sociology will have a wealth
of new material available to further their academic and financial interests. All of these fields will have to
adapt to the unique ethical issues related to digital privacy rights and the management of previously
inconceivable amounts of data.
AQ1
But researchers are not the only stakeholders in these issues. Certainly, academics and other
professionals will have to devise new guidelines for their internal use and public policy may have to
change rapidly but these modifications will be of limited value if the public at large does not understand
or engage with the broader community of those who are gathering and using such data. Both to maintain
the integrity of such data sets and to protect possibly vulnerable individuals, it is imperative that the
ethical reasoning behind Big Data decision­making is a transparent and intelligible process. This chapter
will attempt to discuss what some of the ethical issues are in Big Data collection and a theory of how to
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think about privacy rights. Throughout, examples will be given from both academic literature and
everyday life which will hopefully encourage researchers to think about how they can communicate with
the public about Big Data. A theoretical approach is adopted and applied to several intersecting segments
of society with an emphasis on civic actors. Finally, a few practical suggestions will be given that may
prove useful for ensuring the integrity of the data themselves as well as providing confidence to the
public who are giving the data.
Theoretical frameworks for understanding violations of privacy and consent can come from civil liberties
and social justice movements. One early approach can be taken from American lawyer Lawrence Lessig,
whose 1999 book Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace was written for a lay audience and published at a
time when there was little existing legislation or public discussion on digital civil liberties. In that work,
he suggests that there are four main regulators of online activity: Code (or Architecture), Laws, Markets,
and Norms. There are inherent technical features of what technology we have and how they function
which can generally be referred to as “Code”. In the case of Big Data, that infrastructure has exploded
into realms which were science fiction in 1999. For instance, security research firm Trend Micro created
“GasPot” which is a digital honeypot used to simulate a gas pump (in computing honeypots are
deliberately unsafe traps designed to attract malicious agents such as identity thieves or spammers). They
found that this digital gas pump had 23 attacks on it in the course of a few months in early 2015 simply
by virtue of being connected to the Internet. The clear implication is that actual gas pumps which accept
our credit card information and have connections to security cameras are possibly just as vulnerable and
definitely far more dangerous if compromised.
Big Data are collected, analyzed, and sometimes disseminated by private and well as public actors. For
instance, the accumulation of market research data through social media has made it possible for ad
companies such as Facebook and Google to create vast digital empires using business models that would
have been impossible a decade ago. Additionally, government agencies collect huge quantities of data
through telecommunications for the purposes of law enforcement, surveillance, epidemiology, and a host
of other concerns. The technological tools that have allowed these organizations to gather and analyze
these data are simply too sophisticated and change too rapidly for the public at large to give informed
consent about the collection and use of such information. This requires the public to give a greater level
of trust to these institutions than ever before, including many instances of implicit approval or simple
blind faith in the best intentions of corporate and governmental organizations.
To use a simple example, virtually no users read software end user license agreements (EULAs) (Bakos
et al.  2014 ). This problem has been apparent for over a decade and has resulted in serious breaches of
privacy on the part of users who have made unwarranted assumptions about software providers being
well­intentioned and who have also been intimidated by increasingly dense legalese used for increasingly
long agreements. As this software becomes more deeply embedded in everyday life, it is unreasonable to
expect that the average user will have a true understanding of what kind of information is being collected
about him and how it will be used. The terms of such EULAs almost invariably favor sellers over users
and buyers (Marotta­Wurgler 2011).
In the United States, many researchers could be considered members of the civic sector—they do not
have the same priorities as private business interests nor public state actors, although at times have
features of both or work with either. Civic sector organizations such as non­profits and co­operatives
generally have greater degrees of trust placed in them in part due to the legal and practical demands of
transparency that are placed upon them. Problems of trust are particularly acute amongst voluntary
associations by their very nature as they cannot compel compliance like a state actor and they typically
cannot provide the compensation of businesses. Since trust is a key element in the efficacy of institutions
to perform (Newton and Norris 1999 ), it is necessary that researchers engender that trust by actively
2/29/2016
3/9
engaging the public when it comes to privacy concerns about Big Data; otherwise, they risk losing out on
possible sources of data through non­compliance and disinterest.
Public perceptions of Big Data, privacy, and digital civil liberties in the United States can be dated to
pre­ and post­Edward Snowden whisteblowing. Reports vary about the ways in which Americans have
modified their online habits as well as the extent to which they are concerned about issues related to
pervasive surveillance. For instance, Preibusch (2015) concludes that although, “media coverage of
[American domestic spying program] PRISM and surveillance was elevated for the 30 weeks following
PRISM day, many privacy behaviors faded quickly”. Alternatively, Schneier (2014) point out that over
700 million Internet users worldwide have taken some steps to change their behavior to avoid National
Security Agency surveillance. The survey data conclude that in the United States and abroad, average
Internet consumers definitely have concerns about personal privacy in Big Data from governmental
(CIGI­Ipsos 2014 ; Rainie and Madden 2015) as well as corporate sources (Fisher and Timberg 2013).
One possible explanation for this seeming disjunct between attitudes and behaviors is how difficult it is
for typical Internet users to understand complex tools for protecting privacy. Since the polling data and
common sense tell us that online services as well as portable and wearable computers are such ordinary
devices for millions, they are unwilling or unable to forgo their convenience and ubiquity in spite of
genuine, rational concerns about Big Data collection and retention.
In the face of this, some providers of online services have offered or mandated tools which are intended
to make Internet users more secure. This is one part of reaching out to the public about ethical concerns
in Big Data: using “push” technologies that force users to be more privacy­conscious. For instance, in
2015, the Wikimedia Foundation (WMF)—operators of several online educational resources, including
Wikipedia—filed suit against the NSA and Department of Justice with representation by the American
Civil Liberties Union. Their argument was that the hundreds of millions of users of the encyclopedia
were harmed by indiscriminate collection of upstream data by the United States federal government. The
case was dismissed due to lack of standing with the court arguing that the plaintiffs could not prove they
were subject to upstream surveillance. How in principle they could prove this when the surveillance
program is secret was not explained by the court. They appealed in 2016 and comparable filings by
non­profits such as Clapper v. Amnesty International US have been dismissed on similar grounds.
The WMF also implemented HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) on all Web traffic
starting later that year, which is the culmination of a process begun years prior to Snowden’s
whistleblowing activities. This technology requires users to access to the site using an encrypted
connection rather than plain HTTP which allows intermediary agents like Internet service providers
(ISPs) to view traffic in plain text. Previously, users were simply given the option of viewing the
encyclopedia with HSTS and in 2013, logged in users were required to use it as a part of editing. The
average reader would not notice any difference aside from a small icon changing in a web browser but
this policy seriously decreases the possibility of “man in the middle” attacks which allow faking of
credentials. These attacks had become increasingly common across the Web in the first decade of the
encyclopedia’s existence.
As a 501(c)(3) charitable organization, they regularly publish transparency reports which inform users of
federal government demands for data. They also helped to generate significant political action in 2012 by
blacking out Wikipedia to protest SOPA and PIPA—proposed Congressional legislation that would have
had a chilling effect on online communication and which would have imposed mandated snooping of
users by ISPs. Subsequent attempts by law enforcement to deputize ISPs have been introduced regularly
and have been defeated by a combination of political will and public outcry.
These attempts to engage the public on digital privacy are not limited to non­profits. One such example
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of a large Internet community operated as a for­profit is link­sharing message board Reddit, which is run
as an independent company with former direct owner Advance Publications as a large shareholder. The
site also participated in SOPA/PIPA blackouts and began publishing transparency reports in 2015,
explicitly acknowledging privacy concerns related to online surveillance. They have also taken a hardline
stance on harassing behavior including doxxing—the intentional leaking of personally identifying
information about users. These details are published in order to shame or threaten others into silencing
them from discussing controversial topics. Sometimes, this is done purely as prankery and other times it
is to gain privilege to someone’s real life, such as sending threats in the mail. The tension between free
speech to share information and the concerns of vulnerable individuals and groups which require
anonymity has played out in controversial message boards which site administrators deemed to be
excuses for harassment and trolling. The site has banned user accounts and boards which existed solely to
mock minority groups or which attempted to spread nude celebrity photos after high­profile data
breaches. Similar struggles between free expression which culminates in abuse is not purely theoretical
or confined to cyberspace—protests on college campuses about safe spaces and allegedly bigoted
policies hasve been increasing in the United States for years. This is another valuable method of
engaging the public: creating community norms and rules which demand respecting others’ privacy. As it
becomes understood as a part of simple etiquette that others have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the
ethical principle behind that rule can be more easily enforced and encouraged.
A unique hybrid of a state agency cooperating with a non­state actor is the TOR Project. This
organization was created in 2006 to manage the TOR Browser as well as other online communication
projects which are based on “onion routing” initially developed by the United States Naval Research
Laboratory. The history and technical specifications of the technology can be complicated but simply
put, onion routing passes Internet communications through several encrypted layers—hence the
metaphor of an onion. Since the data are bounced around many agents before reaching their final
destination, it is extremely difficult to determine where a request originated and the only way to reliably
de­anonymize this traffic is if a user does it himself, such as by accidentally associating his personal e­
mail address with activities performed on the TOR software network. The initial purpose of the
technology was for military intelligence but it has since grown into a vast network which runs a kind of
parallel Internet sometimes known as the Dark Web which includes sites that can only be accessed via
the TOR Browser. The Dark Web includes the same type of mundane information that anyone would
anticipate on the Internet such as chat and search services but also allows for new opportunities for illicit
drug sales, gun smuggling, fraud, and other illegal or gray market activities. It also allows for very secure
communication between whisteblowers and news agencies, especially when it is paired with SecureDrop
which lets users share files with one another.
The ironic twist is that law enforcement not only monitors this traffic heavily and conducts sting
operations using it but actually provides much of the architecture that allows for this communication in
the first place with computers that connect to the TOR network know as “exit nodes”. Intelligence
agencies are in the curious position of both making this highly secure communications technology and
constantly trying to undermine its integrity. For instance, in 2014 a number of international law
enforcement agencies cooperated to shut down Dark Web drug markets, particularly Silk Road 2.0 which
usually operated by trading designer drugs for Bitcoin. In the process, it is suspected that the FBI paid
researchers at Carnegie Mellon University to try to break the anonymity of the TOR network. The
relationship between the public and civic sectors here becomes as complicated as the technical aspects of
the software itself but the take­away for researchers who have highly sensitive data is that TOR paired
with SecureDrop is an excellent way to transfer information. Additionally, it is very user­friendly, unlike
other secure systems such as PGP for e­mail. In the words of the NSA itself, TOR is “the King of high­
secure, low­latency Internet anonymity” with “no contenders for the throne in waiting”.
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Such attempts to engage the public are also not limited to online service providers. Manufacturers of
mobile devices have also promoted more secure communication—for instance, Apple has included end­
to­end encryption in recent models of iPhones and had a high­profile dispute in 2016 with the FBI
regarding attempts to decrypt a phone associated with a mass shooting. The other major smartphone
vendor is Google, whose Android operating system comes in several varieties across many devices, so
their approach to encrypted communications cannot be as uniform as Apple but they have also insisted to
the public as well as law enforcement agencies that the company has no way of accessing the content of
messages sent on Android devices (and these claims are easier to substantiate since Android is made of
free software that anyone can modify or audit for security concerns). They have issued similar warnings
to users of their Chrome web browser and other services they provide. This is in the interests of both the
end user and the company, who can claim plausible deniability about being liable for the content of any
messages sent using these devices and services. If they cannot in a technical sense snoop on users, then
they cannot be mandated to do so legally. This frees up resources that the company can use to be
profitable rather than be deputized for surveillance.
One large lacuna in this discussion is connected devices which are not personal computers per se.
Wearable devices including fitness trackers, home furnishings such as thermostats, and even the
increasingly sophisticated computers in automobiles are all connected to Internet cloud service providers
through the Internet of Things (IoT). It is possible that this vast array of mundane objects will provide far
greater and more intimate information about users than even personal computers and smartphones. They
also have unique vulnerabilities: researchers have shown through controlled tests that these devices can
be hijacked remotely by third parties to cause motorists to lose control of their vehicles and critically
important medical devices can be caused to malfunction. Fear of malicious hackers (i.e. “crackers”) who
want to take control of these systems may cause members of the public to be skeptical of helpful and
professionally gathered data. The ironic side effect is that users will have given up masses of information
involuntarily in their day­to­day lives but will not be willing to trust researchers who have good
intentions for gathering data and professional standards for maintaining confidentiality. This can literally
start from birth with connected devices such as baby monitors. Gao (2015 ) has shown that Americans
already believe overwhelmingly that they want to control their personal information but cannot. This
problem could be particularly acute as responsiveness to polling has been falling in America for several
years prior to concerns about snooping. (Christian et al.  2012 ) Researchers who use wearable computers
are encouraged to consider whether or not real­time data collection is necessary or appropriate for their
projects. Some of these devices can collect and store data on the device itself and that data can be
retrieved once the gadget is returned rather than broadcasting it.
These problems are apparent even to agencies which traffic in Big Data—in 2012, the NSA internally
promoted a staffer to be the “Socrates of the National Security Agency” and write a column on ethical
issues for other employees. One serious question already raised is that of consent. It is taken for granted
in professional fields that handle private data that consent must be given to acquire such data and that a
subject must be informed in order to give that consent, such as in Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) requirements for medical investigators and practitioners. But HIPAA
requirements break down when paired with Big Data, as insurers and third parties can easily de­
anonymize such data by comparing it to public records. And since such data are held by a variety of
hospitals and health plans, they are vulnerable to attack by identity thieves who have a thriving market
for pilfered medical records. (Chideya 2015) Vendors such as Microsoft are working on entirely new
encryption and data management schemes specifically for the medical industry.
Returning to Lessig’s framework, legal challenges to protecting digital civil liberties have become
increasingly necessary in the United States. The executive and legislative branches either struggle to keep
up with a changing landscape for digital privacy or are simply too invested in mining such data to want to
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constrain themselves from getting it—consider that the CIA even spied on Congress under provisions of
the Patriot Act. Founded in 1990, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF; which has included Lessig on
its board) is one of the oldest digital rights organizations and has participated in several legal challenges
to surveillance and other breaches of digital privacy. Although U.S.­based, they work globally to
challenge repressive laws and partner with other such non­profits. There has perhaps been no other
organization as successful in reaching the public regarding digital rights issues.
Lawsuits do not only target government agencies and outreach to the public must also include market­
based solutions. The commercial world is deeply invested in Big Data and this creates an inherent tension
between personal privacy and efficiency in firms. This dichotomy has been challenged by Calo (2015)
who argues that markets actually rely upon privacy to function and that the Federal Trade Commission
“has emerged as the de facto privacy authority in the United States”. There need not be a disjunct
between privacy and profitability in Big Data, especially since innovative products and services are
created in market situations in order to preserve the integrity of such data. It is important to balance
critiques of government surveillance with market reform in order to make a robust and durable culture of
digital rights. (Paterson 2014) The division between legal­ and market­based solutions also breaks down
when we consider the great extent to which private and public entities cooperate on collecting and
trading Big Data. One such collaboration is police departments in dozens of states which pay for the
rights to databases generated by repo firms using license plate scanners. These devices take millions of
pictures of license plates in parking lots and compare them to records that the company has to determine
where a delinquent customer is in order to tow an automobile. These data are collected with virtually no
effort and can be used to track the movements of almost anyone with an automobile.
But cultures do not exist based solely on tools, legal codes, and commerce. The final piece of Lessig’s
framework is norms—which by their very nature are not codified. As Lessig puts it in Code, “we live life
subject to these norms… [they] constrain us in ways that are so familiar as to be all but invisible”.
These tacit feelings regarding privacy are sometimes the strongest ways of reaching the public regarding
their digital rights. For instance, once a member of the public is shown how trivial it can be to de­
anonymize Big Data or to make inferences based on what has been collected, this can cause a sense of
having been violated. These inchoate expressions of outrage have been manifested in public
demonstrations like Restore the Fourth rallies which were held throughout the United States roughly
overlapping the Occupy movement but also come up in mundane situations such as when one swipes to
view the next picture on someone’s smartphone without permission. In order to effectively reach the
public, it is necessary to capitalize on these justified perceptions which take abstract and sometimes
overly complicated arguments about end­to­end encryption or monitoring of air­gapped laptops through
heat signatures and makes these ethical concerns salient. Harnessing such feelings and making them
persist into something more substantial is imperative.
What does this all mean for the research community? Academics do not have the power or resources of
multinational corporations or governments, so the concerns raised above may seem irrelevant. For that
matter, institutional review boards and professional standards act as watchdogs against malfeasance—
they are not perfect instruments but they generally work well and create an ethical culture amongst
academia. Big Data problems can still exist through misperception and a simple lack of understanding of
best practices. If the horizon of the digital landscape moves too quickly for the public, then it certainly
can for researchers as well who are deeply invested in their work and the systems that they have in place.
Well­intentioned and competent investigators still have to be able to communicate to the public as well
as their peers that Big Data are secure and that best practices are followed.
This chapter has largely focused on the United States but there is a serious tension between Americans
and Europeans characterized by Kerry ( 2014) as, “conventional wisdom in Europe that Americans do
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not care about privacy”. This can cause a serious rift and have legal implications. Take the example of
Boston College and “The Belfast Project”—an oral history on The Troubles in Northern Ireland which
was created in 2001. Researchers interviewed former IRA members whose personal stories included
details about illegal activity. The interviewers assured the subjects that their stories would remain
confidential until they died but those tapes were requested by the Police Service of Northern Ireland
leading to a legal battle that has lasted for years. It is further complicated by the fact that the College has
distanced itself from the Project organizers and the History Department claimed to be largely ignorant of
it even existing until the 2010 publication of the book Voices from the Grave. The precedent this sets
legally and culturally can have serious implications for researchers but it is a microcosm of a larger issue
of trust between American and European institutions.
To use the framework that Lessig created, researchers can discuss Big Data privacy with the public by
referring to Code, Laws, Markets, and Norms. In terms of Code, researchers can make sure that they are
using best practices by consulting EFF publications and using some of the digital tools that they make
available at no cost. Another excellent resource for electronic privacy is the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC), which is a Washington, D. C.­based research center. Similar digital rights
organizations exist globally such as Bits of Freedom in The Netherlands, South Africa’s Right2Know,
and the United Kingdom’s Open Rights Group. One radical solution may involve simply not using digital
records in the first place or digitizing print records for the purposes of analysis and then destroying the
digital copies but retaining the print ones. This measure may prove impractical for many researchers but
even simply having the computers which store Big Data be disconnected from the Internet is enough to
make these records far more secure. Alternately, researchers can store large datasets on optical media or
thumb drives. This division between devices which are connected and those which are not is not only a
practical concern but one that helps to ease the fears of members of the public—as Hogan and Shepherd
(2015) found, “control of the physical location of data centers shapes the possibilities of data agency and
ownership”. If you can display to the public how Big Data are stored in a different place and
disconnected from the Internet, it can increase feelings of security in addition to the actual level of
security itself.
In terms of Law, compliance is actually a double­edged sword. Since one of the main reasons for
apprehension about Big Data collection is government snooping, it is important to communicate to the
public that you have a transparency policy and explain what you do with data and with government
requests for data. Researchers may wish to publish a warrant canary and similar statements about data
integrity aimed at informing the public about the seriousness with which the academic community takes
data sensitivity.
Regarding Market­based changes, researchers are encouraged to look for alternatives to common
technologies which provide greater security and lower cost. Using computers which have free operating
systems can allow for more flexibility and control over the settings of the device—examples include
BSD and GNU/Linux rather than Mac OS X and Windows. This has the added bonus of encouraging
further use of safer computer systems. The more common it is to use these operating systems, the more
tools will be developed for them. Additionally, these software communities have volunteers who work on
making fixes and taking suggestions on how to improve their work, so if there is a feature that you would
like to see, you can suggest it. (Note that the free database program PostgreSQL is slated to include Big
Data functionality.) Not all researchers will be able to invest the time in learning new operating systems
nor will they always be able to control which devices they can use but it is worth discussing which
options are legitimate with someone in an IT department who can likely offer some alternatives.
Finally, normative outreach to the public is powerful and can be accomplished through subtle means. The
attitudes that Big Data researchers have are as important as any tools or laws. As Boyd (2010 ) has
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suggested, “the biggest methodological danger zone presented by our collective obsession with Big Data:
Just because data is accessible doesn’t mean that using it is ethical”. [emphasis in the original] Having
a friendly and approachable manner when discussing privacy engenders greater trust. There is a human
element to Big Data that can sometimes be overlooked by an obsessive focus on computers and
smartphones as well as assumptions that more data are always better (recall the problems of finding
needles in haystacks).
Conducting research today is an exciting and dangerous prospect. Big Data exists in virtually every form
about almost all of us and it is used in ways that were unimaginable in the past. It is paramount that the
community of Big Data users and collectors remember that such data are not just “out there” somewhere
but are the intimate details of real persons’ lives and they have just as deep an interest in protecting their
privacy as they do in the good work that is conducted with such data. It remains to be seen if the world
has the wisdom and forbearance to follow the advice of Wau Holland: protect private data, use public
data.
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